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Abstract
This paper examines management responses to
environmental and hydrological change related to
growing water scarcity. It draws on experiences in
the catchment of the Great Ruaha River in
Tanzania to reflect on the theory and process of
creating effective and workable goals and
strategies for river basin management. We find
that various gaps occur in the pursuit of normative
‘integrated water resources management’ (IWRM)
that can be attended to by applying a focused
expedient approach to address identified problems
in three states of the water availability regime:
‘critical water’, ‘medial water’ and ‘bulk water’. In
exploring this expedient approach, the paper
presents an adaptive framework for river basin
management and considers some implications for
the science of river basin management as a
whole. We suggest that while IWRM provides a
language to describe river basin management, it
does not readily generate the necessary responses
to deal with identified problems. Moreover, we
argue that the heart of this framework both fosters,
and is comprised from, rigorous social and
technical learning.1
From Integrated to Expedient: An Adaptive
Framework for River Basin Management in
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Introduction
practices, designed to match and accommodate
the complex and ‘mosaic’ nature of the problem.
IWRM gives managers a long list of activities to
execute, many of them simultaneously. Based on
this perspective, the World Bank’s influential
strategy booklet in 1993 led to projects being
established that embodied this integrated
thinking, also termed  as a ‘comprehensive
approach’ (World Bank 1993). This paper utilizes
one particular case study in southern Tanzania
and the literature to examine IWRM, to explore
its evolving nature and to reflect on recent
discussions regarding its design.
We contribute to the debate by proposing a
model which focuses relentlessly on ‘problems’
on the ground rather than on IWRM principles to
be articulated. The framework for our paper can
be referred to in figure 1, which contrasts two
systems of designing and incorporating integrated
water resources (or river basin) management. On
the left hand side, we outline the manner in
which governments and donor projects have in
the recent past attempted to operationalize
normative comprehensive IWRM programs (van
Koppen et al. 2004; World Bank 1996) that
incorporate the Dublin Principles (ICWE 1992). A
defining feature of contemporary river basin
management is the ‘IWRM continuum’ from the
The management of water in large river basins
represents a highly challenging task. It
assembles a wide range of activities within a
connected physiographic unit in order to move
basin stakeholders, usually many thousands of
them, collectively to new patterns of water use
and allocation that provide for varying degrees of
economic and environmental enhancement and
protection. This requires the adjustment of
fluctuating quantities and qualities of water
supply to disparate users whose water demands
tend to increase, and who derive from water a
wide variety of benefits and outputs. River basin
management entails complex ‘project
management activities’ such as: establishing
goals, policies and strategies; implementing
decision-making frameworks; monitoring and
enforcing compliance; promoting participation;
improving infrastructure; leveraging finances;
recovering costs; and monitoring outcomes in
order to make necessary changes.
Reflecting these multiple challenges,
‘integrated water resources management’
(IWRM)
1 has entered the lexicon of water
managers and stakeholders as the mainstream
approach to water management. IWRM in an
idealized form denotes a set of principles,
usually accompanied by a package of tools and
1 This paper examines IWRM applied to river basin management in a sub-Saharan context.2
Dublin Principles, to the statement of National
Water Policy, leading to a National Water
Strategy, in turn leading to a strong connection
between this strategic level of comprehensive
thinking and the operational programs that are
effected. Clearly, these operational programs
differ from the comprehensive template because
they cannot, without considerable funding,
capture the whole picture. This is largely
understood amongst most informed scientists;
in large river basins, the constraints associated
with scale, data availability, policing, knowledge,
logistics, variability and systemic interfaces
invalidates the pursuit of a complete ‘integrated
water resources management’ as defined by the
Global Water Partnership (GWP 2000), the
European Commission (EC 1998) and others.
Yet, we take the thinking further. On the right
hand side of figure 1 we propose that the
comprehensive framework of IWRM should not
be the starting point for drawing up water
operations, and that instead the main frame of
reference should be the problems identified in
the catchment, and the ongoing iterative
relationships with stakeholders in the
catchment.
FIGURE 1.
The deployment of IWRM policy and operations – a partial ideal or expedient?3
Thus, in this paper, we argue that the
challenge is not to attempt to deploy the
comprehensive list of integrated solutions or to
partially apply components if they do not fit the
situation, but to formulate precise interventions to
solve existing or foreseen problems in the pursuit
of stated goals. We have termed this an
‘interpretive, expedient process’, which requires
the capacity to generate new kinds of thinking,
the identification of solutions that work
effectively, the confidence to implement them,
and the need to question some basic
assumptions that underpin water resources
management (WRM). Expedient WRM can be
defined as ‘advisable on practical rather than
principled grounds’
2 – thus emphasizing a shift
towards problem identification and solution, and
away from the adoption of accepted norms –
including the Dublin Principles. Under this
approach, the national water policy and strategy
would be purposively cast to be more
comprehensive than expedient basin operational
plans and yet allow for local context to be fully
‘expressed’. Our approach has clear links to
“adaptive management,” an approach found more
often in North America and Europe than in
developing countries (discussed further below).
Thus, while Biswas (2004) is correct in
critiquing the vagueness of the concept of
IWRM, the distinction between strategy and
operation provides a mechanism for discussion,
a point that Mitchell (2004) makes in his
response to Biswas’ paper. This distinction is
well illustrated by reference to the UK and other
‘northern’ countries as well as to Australia and
even South Africa, where despite considerable
financial resources, implementation of full IWRM
remains elusive. In these countries, using the
IWRM concept to inform strategy, operational
mechanisms have been created to steer water
management to be increasingly integrated, with
for example environmental management and
land-use planning, and to manage and minimize
water conflicts. When Biswas claims that the
concept’s use has been “indiscernible in the field”
and that IWRM’s “impact to improve water
management has at best been marginal” he
overlooks that it forms the central pillar of the
European Water Framework Directive (WFD)(EC
1998). The WFD is widely accepted as the most
significant piece of water legislation produced in
the past 20 years and although still in its infancy
in terms of implementation, it looks set to bring
increasingly integrated decision-making and
‘better’ water outcomes (Fox et al. 2004).
The WFD is based on a model of integrated
catchment management long used in the UK,
which has a track record of bringing measurable
environmental, social and economic benefits, for
example, improved water quality, flood prevention
and drought management, re-colonization by
indicator species such as salmon and otters, the
reversal of ecological decline, and economic
regeneration and tourism benefits as documented
by Wood et al. (1999) and the Environment
Agency (2002). Thus, there is a strong case for
the positive impact of the IWRM paradigm.
However, success has been based on the
gradual adaptation of existing management
activities to tackle real problems such as the
setting and monitoring of water quality objectives;
the statutory consultations of water managers
and local stakeholders on planning applications
and regional strategic plans; targeting of
investment programs on local priority issues; the
issuing and policing of permits or temporary
notices to control activities posing a risk to water
use; and, the regular development of ostensibly
‘participatory’ integrated catchment management
plans. Of course, this field-informed success
must be contextualized, being driven by a
requirement to meet EU legislation, made
possible by significant infrastructure investment
by privatized water companies, and overseen by
a powerful regulator in the form of an
Environment Agency with over 11,000 staff and
an annual expenditure of £867 million
(approximately US$1.6 billion) (Environment
Agency 2005) – a luxury affordable only by very
few wealthy nations. Nevertheless, a model of
2 The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘expedient’ as ‘advisable on practical rather than moral grounds’ and as ‘means to attain an end’.4
expedient WRM is provided. Perhaps, Biswas is
frustrated at the failings of IWRM implementation
where countries lacking the necessary capacity
and financial resources have tried to map ‘full
IWRM’; this has led him to question the
usefulness of the IWRM concept itself rather
than addressing contextualization and
interpretative issues, where scope for creativity
and accuracy lies.
Understanding the process by which
operational programs arise has implications for
the science of water resources management. In
discussing, not the translation of strategic IWRM
into operational IWRM, but an adaptive-expedient
approach, we propose a more practical
framework which relies on designing activities
against stated and relatively short term (5-10
year) goals of allocation. Granted, equally
important is political expedience; IWRM
represents an opportunity to make political
choices about allocation (Allan 2003; Swatuck
2005) and to influence stakeholders in that quest.
While the authors acknowledge that water
management at the river basin scale is an
endeavor that is political
3, we argue that river
basin management can also be examined in
scientific terms. This is a valid exercise
because, although appearing to be a
‘comprehensive’ science, IWRM reveals, we
argue, some scientific errors made in the pursuit
of sensible outcomes. The problem is that river
basin management is political and economic in
nature, and is often constrained by a legal and
institutional apparatus that cannot be transformed
quickly. Thus, we agree it is possible to critique
IWRM as a politically naïve discourse as Allan
(2003) persuasively does, but in addition one can
explore the scientific naivety of IWRM – in both
theory and practice – and then ask how this
further shapes the scope for political
interpretation.
On a more critical note, analysis of actual
IWRM operations manifests itself as critiques of
integrated water management or of specific and
generic concerns regarding the appropriateness
of river basin institutions to developing countries.
For example, Shah et al. (2005) and Carter
(1998) are concerned with the applicability of
river basin management institutions and
approaches that work in rich countries to
resource-poor situations, and conclude that there
are many risks in copying normative, fully-
fledged IWRM to local situations. Shah et al.
(2005) point out that the physical, social,
institutional and economic conditions
characterizing developing countries are totally
different than those in the rich temperate zone
countries, and also the objectives are usually
completely different. An engagement with the
size of the IWRM task has also been explored
by Moriarty et al. (2004) where ‘light’ IWRM
refers to its application by individuals,
communities and sub-sectors, whereas ‘full’
IWRM envisions a sector-wide overhaul leading
to a much greater level of coordinated
application. Based on detailed field research in
South Asia, Moench et al. (2003) conclude that
attempts to implement classic IWRM are not
likely to be successful as people focus on
constraints and immediate tasks, and not on
integration of numerous factors that may have an
influence. Merrey et al. (2005) criticize the focus
on environmental concerns and demand
management at the expense of poverty issues in
developing countries, especially underdeveloped
areas such as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Jonker
(2006) in a recent paper has described the
“perceived failure of implementing IWRM in South
Africa.” While South Africa has expended
considerable effort to get the principles right,
“conceptual shortcomings” as well as capacity
limitations are inhibiting actual implementation. In
the follow-up to the 1993 strategy, the World
Bank 2002 review (Pitman 2002) identifies
shortcomings in rolling out IWRM; however, this
reads more as an eclectic list of ‘lessons-learnt’
rather than being grounded in a structure of how
to generate meaningful operational strategies.
3 Indeed, Wester and Warner (2002) note the entire concept of river basin management ignores the inherently political nature of such
an exercise.5
Some of these practical concerns are being
captured in an emerging body of research and
theory around the term ‘adaptive water resources
management’ (National Research Council 2004;
Swanson et al. 2004) that in turn mirrors
developments in adaptive natural resources
management (NRM)(Hagmann and Chuma 2002;
Stankey et al. 2005; Tompkins and Adger 2004).
Nonetheless, as Stankey et al. (2005) conclude,
even though adaptive NRM implies practical
action, it “remains primarily an ideal rather than a
demonstrated reality” (p. 56).  Although effective
and accurate practice remains an uncertain
outcome, we attempt here to define strategic
characteristics that foster pragmatism. One
insight, that has parallels with the literature, is
the central role of learning and social
communication as drivers for adaptation.
In the next section, we introduce the case
study, which we believe is representative of the
characteristics of many basins in sub-Saharan
Africa and some Asian countries. We complete
our critique of IWRM as practiced in many
developing countries, and explain our
‘expedient water management framework’
under four headings: achieving basic
understanding as a basis for intervention
(acquiring knowledge); development of
expedient water goals (creating goals); water
management as an expedient response
(establishing strategies); and social water
management learning (guiding and enriching the
WRM cycle). The final section reflects on the
implications of the proposed framework for
management of river basins in developing
countries.
Case Study: The Great Ruaha River Basin
The geographical context of this study is the
Great Ruaha River Basin in the southern
highlands of Tanzania, an area of 68,000 km
2
(figures 2 and 3). The basin contains the Upper
Great Ruaha, synonymous with the Usangu
Plains catchment, covering an area of 21,500
km
2 and forming the headwaters of the Great
Ruaha River. The Great Ruaha Basin itself is a
major sub-basin of the Rufiji River, and the
subject of numerous studies (e.g., Danida/World
Bank 1995; USBR 1967; FAO 1960). The Ruaha
River Basin is a good candidate for research on
the science of river basin management on the
basis of its size, complexity, national
significance, competing users and history of river
basin initiatives (Hazelwood and Livingstone
1978). The case study is described in a number
of articles (Baur et al. 2000; Lankford and Franks
2000; Lankford 2004; Franks et al. 2004). Much
of the research we draw upon was carried out
with the support of two successive projects
supported by the UK’s Department for
International Development (DFID): ‘Sustainable
Management of the Usangu Wetland and its
Catchment’ (SMUWC) and ‘Raising Irrigation
Productivity and Releasing Water for Intersectoral
Needs (RIPARWIN - McCartney et al. 2007). The
scientific research done under these projects has
helped increase understanding of the underlying
causes of contentious problems such as
perceptions of a conflict between water used for
irrigation and water to generate electricity, causes
of the drying of Usangu Wetland during the dry
season, and why a project designed in part to
address these issues, the River Basin
Management and Smallholder Irrigation
Improvement Project (RBMSIIP - World Bank
1996) in its initial conceptualization addressed
the wrong issues.
The basin has a single rainy season but the
rains are irregular, localized and spatially
variable—in other words unreliable. The mean6
annual rainfall in the mountains is 1,600 mm, but
only 700 mm in the plains, while mean annual
evapotranspiration is 1,900 mm. The river is
perceived as “drying up”: the wetland is
shrinking, and the previously perennial Ruaha
River has become seasonal over the last
decade, with dry periods lasting from 3-10
weeks. In the upstream areas on the alluvial fans
above the wetlands, irrigated rice production has
expanded rapidly to about 45,000 ha today. There
are two large rice farms owned by the state, and
increasing numbers of smallholder irrigators. The
Usangu produces 14 percent of the total rice
crop in Tanzania, about 60-80,000 tons worth $16
million per year. About 30,000 households
depend on irrigated rice for their livelihoods.
However, the expansion of irrigation in the
upstream areas has led to increasing conflicts
with downstream users, especially the wetland
and National Park, and hydropower. As in many
other developing countries, managing wetland
ecosystems is a new concern for Tanzania, a
signatory of the Ramsar Convention. Also in
common with many other countries, Tanzania is
developing and implementing water and policy
reforms based on IWRM principles—but unlike
many others it is also encouraging rapid
expansion of irrigation. The size of the basin
creates huge logistical problems.
A more detailed review of institutional
development in the area can be read in van
Koppen et al. (2004), from which certain
highlights are given here. In the early 1990s
work by the World Bank lead to the planning of
the River Basin Management and Smallholder
Irrigation Improvement Project (RBMSIIP) that
started in 1996 with a loan from the Bank. This
program funded the Rufiji Basin Water Office
(RBWO) in Iringa, which represented the new
basin approach that the Ministry of Water,
FIGURE 2.
Location of Upper Great Ruaha Catchment in Tanzania.
Source: RIPARWIN project.7
Livestock and Development (MoWLD) gradually
implemented, with the Rufiji, the Pangani and
Lake Victoria as the first pilot basins
4.
RBMSIIP also helped develop a new National
Water Policy (MOWLD 2002; Mutayoba 2002),
followed by the National Water Strategy
(MOWLD 2004) (See Appendix A of this report
for further information).
These characteristics are broadly
representative of many river basins in the
semi-arid tropics, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa
5; therefore lessons learned here provide
important insights for solving similar problems in
other basins. We provide further insights into the
characteristics of the basin in the following
sections to illustrate more general points.
4 A sub-office for the Usangu Plains in Rujewa, Mbarali District, was opened in 2001. The main activity of this sub-office is the issuing
of water rights to irrigators.
5 Another reasonably well-studied example is the Upper Ewaso Ng’iro North Basin in Kenya; see Gichuki (2002) and references
therein. Similarly the Mara River is the focus of a WWF water management program.
FIGURE 3.
Location of Irrigated Lands within the Usangu Plains.
Source: SMUWC 2001.
Note: With regards to figure 3 and table 4:
A = upstream river supply; B = allowable irrigation abstraction; C = target downstream flows; D = losses in wetland;
E = downstream river flows in the Ruaha National Park (RNP). Irrigated areas are shown in yellow.8
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maintained. In contrast, at the operational level,
a more focused approach is needed.” He went
on to argue that at the operational level,
attention should be directed to a smaller number
of issues that account for most of the problems.
Even the World Bank’s comprehensive approach
in 1993 acknowledged that “the complexity of
the analysis would vary according to the
country’s capacity and circumstances, but
relatively simple frameworks can often clarify
priority issues” (p.10). Tapela (2002: 1003) felt
that IWRM needs to relate to context: “the
prospects for river basin institutions achieving
the envisaged outcomes of IWRM are more
strongly determined by the embedded contexts
than by institutional conformity to a given set of
organizational criteria.”
A second aspect of IWRM reveals that water
management is often seen as a meta-theory; that
it is multi-dimensional rather than single-
dimensional in nature. Water management is
‘framed’ within an integrated approach that is
constituted from many different sub-theories—as
reflected in the quoted World Bank definition that
includes, for example, pricing as a necessity for
IWRM, or that water should be approached in an
integrated fashion: “Integrated water resources
management expresses the idea that water
resources should be managed in a holistic way,
coordinating and integrating all aspects and
functions of water extraction, water control and
service delivery so as to bring sustainable and
equitable benefit to all those dependent on the
resource” (EC 1998: 215).
Bringing those two aspects together, we
argue that the nesting of sub-theories within an
integrated framework gives rise to opportunities
to partially reflect the comprehensive viewpoint
by selecting some sub-theories without tailoring
them to the situation on the ground. Thus, the
act of operationalizing IWRM can be via partial
selection of unadulterated application of some
The changing debate on integrated
water resources management
Via lessons learnt in the past few years, and the
debate surrounding integrated water resources
management (IWRM), many commentators are
becoming increasingly aware of the need to
refine the concept so that it delivers effective
outcomes. There are two key aspects to this
debate. The first aspect is the relationship
between an ideal and the actual – and indeed
IWRM is usually discussed by comparing ideal
IWRM (listing principles and what should be
included) to actual IWRM (listing problems and
what a project omitted to do). Thus, IWRM is
defined by the Global Water Partnership as a
process that promotes the coordinated
development and management of water, land and
related resources, in order to maximize the
resultant economic and social welfare in an
equitable manner without compromising the
sustainability of vital ecosystems (GWP 2000).
The World Bank (1993: 10) has a similar
definition: “[IWRM] … is the adoption of a
comprehensive policy framework and the
treatment of water as an economic good,
combined with decentralized management and
delivery structures, greater reliance on pricing,
and fuller participation by stakeholders.”
6  van
Hofwegen (2001: 141), as an example of the
ideal, examines frameworks of IWRM, and
explains that ‘ideal IWRM’ comes from the theory
of IWRM and its principles. His paper outlines in
detail the many requirements that constitute
IWRM.
By contrast, implementation is a balancing
act, on the one hand reflecting the ideal and on
the other hand reflecting the problems found. In
an early analysis, Mitchell (1990: p.4) realized
this pitfall, writing, “At the strategic level, a
comprehensive approach should be used to
ensure that the widest possible perspective is
6 Hooper (2005) quotes other definitions of IWRM and ‘integrated river basin management,’ IRBM, all quite similar.9
component theories, giving an appearance of
choice and focus. This is discernible in
Tanzania when the Basin Office was unable to
institute many components of WRM such as
water quality control, and yet did administer a
fixed water rights system against payment in
the expectation that it would drive re-allocation;
“the use of a water user fee as a means of
encouraging efficient use of the resource and for
meeting the cost of regulatory functions” (World
Bank 1996 – see Appendix A of this report). A
more fundamental starting point for drawing up
an efficient and effective set of water
management activities begins by analyzing the
baseline, and determining local problems framed
against regional and national priorities, and
being informed by that. This then is our
‘recursive, expedient’ theoretical framing of
water resources management, in contrast to an
‘IWRM-continuum’ framing.
Expedient water management
We have used our fieldwork to reflect on a
process of building expediency into water
management. Although there are formulations of
strategies of water management, few papers
explicitly examine the process by which
operational river basin activities are developed
from or refer to the comprehensive template of
IWRM.
Figures 4 and 5 and table 1 propose an
expedient approach to developing a water
management program. Figure 4 combines with
figure 5 to give the matrix in table 1, which
represents the proposed framework. In Figure 4,
we argue that the challenges of basin water
management alter dramatically with changing
‘wetness’ and that this dynamic can be best
reflected by a flow duration curve (FDC)
whereby the basin’s water resources can be
divided into three water states or ‘phases’
7:
‘critical’, ‘medial’ and ‘bulk’. The ‘x axis’ is
frequency and the ‘y axis’ is a measure of water
availability, represented here as river flow rate.
This three-state analysis creates a simple
classification of relative availability that allows
managers to understand the situation of, and
specify goals for, each state and as will be
seen later on, to generate state-specific
activities to fulfill these goals.
‘Critical water’ is that required for vital needs
such as health and domestic purposes,
especially in drought situations. Medial water,
particularly important during dry seasons and dry
years, has to be shared among a number of
sectors, including the environment and
agriculture. Bulk or ‘storable’ water, which occurs
during high-flow periods such as the wet season
in many tropical river basins, provides ample
amounts of water for a variety of purposes,
including topping up of natural and artificial
storage bodies. Strategies for bulk water allow
inter-annual or at least inter-seasonal responses
to demand and crisis, and therefore responses in
one state (e.g., bulk) can affect how water is
managed in another state.   Table 1 explains in
more detail the nature of the three states. Figure
5 is the cycle of management that applies to
each of them to ensure that the goals, needs
and problems arising in different sectors are met.
The shape of the FDC line relative to the
position of the three states or phases is
important: although demand is not represented
here, the shape reveals the degree of aridity of
the basin (for example, given by the flow at 50%
exceedence) and the extent to which the basin
changes between states of extreme wetness and
dryness. While frequency of exceedance does
depict a mathematical reliability of a flow being
exceeded in hydrologic terms, we wish to
emphasize that interpreted correctly, regime
analysis reminds scientists of the ‘unreliable’
nature of water inherent in sub-Saharan hydrology
measured in terms of social and managerial
expectations.  In other words, it is important to
distinguish between floodplain river regimes in a
7 We recognize that these states may succeed each other as ‘phases’ but this is not universally so; hence, we have adopted the term
‘state.’10
temperate zone with baseflows supported by
groundwater (giving a flat curve for much of the
exceedance time) and a floodplain river in semi-
arid climates where there is a low probability of
very large flows, a much higher probability of low
flows during dry periods and a sloping curve
between the two extremes. It is possible to
interpret water management in each state, and to
facilitate transitions between the three states –
i.e., via uses of water that might come from
extra storage. On the graph in figure 4, line 1
shows a wetter basin while line 2 shows a drier
one. While both basins might benefit from more
storage, in Basin 2, the purpose of that storage
would more likely be related to fulfilling livelihood
and domestic needs during the longer and more
frequent periods of low flow. The key argument
being made here, with respect to water resources
management, is to incorporate these natural
behaviors into our thinking – our observations of
responses in Tanzania lead us to suspect that
formal institutions, in politically emphasizing a
development agenda, have seen dryness as a
temporary inconvenience rather than a normal
state of affairs (Lankford and Beale 2007).
Operationally, a failure to appreciate the inherent
transient nature of supply, as exemplified by line
2 in figure 4, was seen in  selling fixed water
rights/permits (e.g., of 250 liters/second) to users
established under the RBMSIIP program.
In figure 5, the cycle of expedient water
management is divided into four main stages,
discussed below. In keeping with our critique of
the science of river basin management, these four
translate into a science of 1) understanding and
characterizing the land, water, people and
institutional behaviors of the basin; 2) establishing
goals; 3) developing a management response to
those goals, and 4) generating activities that lead
to and drive the first three steps.  We have
grouped the first two into a ‘vision process’,
because in the Tanzanian case we noticed that
consensus in understanding the causes of
hydrological change is linked with a consensus on
solutions and a goal of future water allocation and
its role in achieving social and economic
objectives. Figure 5 puts the fourth stage, the
social learning, at the center of the other three.
This is a critical part of how goals and responses
are derived, and although it is the fourth stage, it
FIGURE 4.
The three-state challenge of creating goals and managing river basins.11
might easily have been discussed first or as part
of the second stage.  Figure 5 emphasizes an
iterative cycle of development – these
components do not work in a linear manner. In
particular, participatory processes can be used to
both steer and affect river basin activities
throughout the cycle.
Clearly, ‘expedient’ water management is a
specific application of what is called “adaptive
management” (e.g., MacDonald et al. 1999) and
FIGURE 5.
Adaptive cycle of expedient water management.
Note: I & L refers to Institutional and Legal framework.12
TABLE 1.
Framework for expedient water management of river basins.*
Stage of Sub-stage and Water availability state
framework aspects Bulk water Medial water Critical water
1) Precursor Main supply To top up storage bodies Meet agricultural, Meet living and drinking
understanding function and (artificial, natural, surface, livelihood and ecological needs
priorities of this sub-surface), to flush needs, protecting
phase systems minimum flows
Main period Wet season Dry season Throughout year, but dry
during year season is critical
Sectors Agricultural, Agriculture, industry, Domestic, urban
associated hydropower, environmental
with phase environmental,
Amounts of water Medium to large Small stream flows, Very small amounts of water,
flows >500 l/sec 10 to 500 l/sec 25-300 l/day/pp
Timeliness and Seasonally important Daily to weekly Required daily
timing
Quality of water Medium quality, Medium to high quality Highest quality required
sediments in
flood water
Change and Investigate trends of water supply and demand, and study of driving factors within
causality each phase
Scope for Investigate scope for productivity and efficiency gains within each sector in each
further change phase
2) Setting Principles that Water as an Water as an Water as a human/domestic
expedient goals steer allocation environmental, productive environmental and right
and economic good productive right
Examples of Pro-industry and power, Pro-agriculture, Pro-poor connection
scenarios pro-agriculture pro-environment
Examples of “Ensure a 50 cumec cap “Aim for year round flow” “80% of rural users
water goals on irrigation abstraction” connected”
3) Water Routing the water Routing bulk water Routing medial water Amounts of water required at a
management given time
response
Type of cap** Total volumetric Proportional Volumetric, set by capacity of
abstraction cap abstraction cap supply infrastructure
Infrastructure Intakes, dams, barrages Irrigation intakes, Village boreholes, pipes, taps,
associated boreholes, weirs, dividers bowsers
and control structures
Allocation Catchment and basin WUA Irrigation water user Village borehole committee,
institutions association and water company or NGO
sub-catchment WUA
Type of rights Formal water permit Customary agreements/ Customary agreements
closely associated (volumetric) rights (proportional, time (village and household related)
with phase schedule basis)
Economic Various permutations, payment or non-payment for water rights, proportional shares
instruments and drinking water are possible, though a locally situated analysis might inform how
best such a framework is designed.
(Continued)13
“participatory action research” (e.g., Whyte et al.
1989) in the literature. Adaptive management
and participatory action research both have as
their central drivers the adoption of a social
learning approach: working with key
stakeholders, identifying and prioritizing
problems, designing possible management
solutions, implementing, monitoring and
evaluating, adjusting based on lessons learned,
etc. We recognize the difficulties inherent in
implementing participatory approaches,
especially on large river basins with many
thousands of people with few resources, in a
context where communication systems and
institutional linkages are weak. Nevertheless,
our basic assumption is that for long-run
sustainable and equitable social and economic
development, there are no practical alternatives
to participatory approaches: taking an expedient
approach, the reliance on, and types of,
participation necessarily has to be focused and
fitted to the problems being faced
8.
Stage of Sub-stage and Water availability state
framework aspects Bulk water Medial water Critical water
4) Water Social learning is a process that cuts across all activities in all phases, and is underpinned by consultative
management and participatory processes. Given below are some state-specific activities.
social learning Institutional Basin Office facilitates Intake to Intake Autonomous units around the
connections, and mediates basin representatives of infrastructure supplying water
participation and negotiations irrigation water user
deliberation associations plus outside
mediation
Other tools of Reservoir operation, Field and office based Village and user level
decision-making office decision-aids decision-aids decisions
TABLE 1. (Continued)
Framework for expedient water management of river basins.*
Note: *While some of the points made in this table refer to Usangu only, most are broadly applicable to sub-Saharan African river basins.
Issues and solutions best applicable to one state can be applied to others.
** Setting or quantifying ‘caps’ represents a delineating of quantities for a given sector, and is not necessarily an activity of forcing
down demand or use of water.
8 Experience in Usangu shows that the nature of local user participation in river basin management changes from sub-catchment to
sub-catchment as influenced by catchment characteristics and objectives (Lankford 2001).
Application of the Framework for Expedient Management
Part 1:  Precursor: Integrated
understanding
Context
We argue that to pursue expedient water
management requires an accurate understanding
of the context and problems found in the river
basin. Although we agree that political
expediency, despite the targeted advising of
policymakers, may lead to interpretations of
causes and solutions that are not supported by
studies (Lankford et al. 2004b), the scientific
endeavor of capturing the nature of the
hydrological and environmental change in an area
the size of Usangu should not be14
underestimated.
9 In this regard, Hillman (2006)
unpacks differing perceptions over context for
accurately tailoring river basin management
programs to situations; he found, echoing Briscoe
(1997) that “context matters (a lot!)” when fitting
water management to a given situation.
Context covers an understanding of the
biophysical nature of the challenge. The Great
Ruaha River Basin reflects some biophysical
conditions characteristically found in sub-Saharan
Africa. These conditions have been noted by
other authors (e.g., Carter 1998) as posing
special risks for the application of IWRM. The
size of the sub-basin (68,000 km
2) poses
logistical problems for managing water by formal
rights alone that require monitoring and policing.
Multi-point, dispersed monitoring of both supply
and demand is expensive, and to reduce these
costs and to manage conflicts at the sub-
catchment scale suggests that meaningful forms
of subsidiarity are required—for example,
engaging users in determining their own means
of assessing water distribution. The basin
experiences a single rainy season, when rivers
swell, but they shrink during the dry season
between May and November, a period that
suffers from water scarcity relative to demand,
and conflict. In addition, the area experiences
climate variability typical of sub-Saharan Africa,
giving rise to periodic floods and droughts. This
dissimilarity in water availability versus demand
and associated dynamics suggests that flexibility
is critical; that the three phases of critical,
medial and bulk water exist here; and that the
dry season needs special care when there is
insufficient water to cater to demand from all
sectors. In addition, the lack of aquifer buffering
and re-routing in Usangu prevents downstream
users in accessing water that is used in
inefficient ways upstream. In other words,
storage of water in aquifers for use in the dry
season is not an option for geological reasons,
and water that is used inefficiently by “formal”
users like state rice farms is largely captured by
“informal” users or evaporates unproductively and
does not return to the river.
As well as the physical attributes of a river
basin, its ‘political economy’ has a major influence
on water management. Formulating an effective
response shows up inevitable gaps between
legislation, institutions, organizations and desirable
outcomes of water management – this has long
been understood in river basin management. For
example, Moss (2004) examines institutional gaps
in river basin management and argues that
strategies should recognize that land use affects
water use. Cleaver and Franks (2003), based on
detailed field research in the Ruaha Basin, argue
that the embeddedness of local institutions in
complex livelihoods renders designing institutions
for water management highly problematic. As
economic development continues, layers of
complexity can be added. In Chile (Bauer 1998),
the trade-off in uses is between irrigation and
hydropower, which is arguably relatively
straightforward compared to balances to be found
between water pollution, protection of minimum
flows, inter-basin transfer and groundwater
management.
Further, if IWRM strategies are to address
issues that are of importance “locally”, this can
only be achieved by understanding the socio-
political context and especially the conflicts that
characterize the area. These conflicts are driven
by the differential objectives and interests of the
various stakeholders. The latter represent all the
issues that matter to the different stakeholders
and can be defined as “values” (Keeney 1994). As
stated by Hermans (2001: 183), “if these values
are not characterized, analysis efforts by
hydrologists and other experts are likely to have
very little impact on actual decision making”. By
defining the values that motivate different actors
in each of the three flow phases, alternatives can
be generated when defining articulated water goals
and therefore lead to an expedient response.
9 In Usangu, this was achieved by the application of SMUWC (Sustainable Management of the Usangu Wetland and its Catchment)
and RIPARWIN (Raising Irrigation Productivity and Releasing Water for Intersectoral Needs) surveys and analyses lasting more than
five dry and wet seasons, conducted by more than 20 scientists from various disciplines who in turn interacted with local stakeholders.15
Causation – examining hydrological change
Investigations play a critical role in determining
and isolating the factors affecting water
distribution so that appropriate policies may be
crafted. The studies we envisage goes beyond
simply monitoring water flows to make the
exercise explicitly part of ‘problem-orientated’
vigilance. This focus on simple monitoring of
flows explains the fact that although the Ruaha
River dried in the early 1990s, the causes of that
change could not be explained until the SMUWC
project began its work in 1999. In addition, the
responses to the problems, perceived and real,
illustrate the need to arrive at a consensus
understanding of the causes of the changes
(Lankford et al. 2004b).
The SMUWC and RIPARWIN projects found
that the main reason for hydrological change was
the increased abstraction of water into irrigation
intakes during the dry season. This water meets
important livelihood needs but also leads to
much non-beneficial depletion. The ability to
abstract more water arose from the increasing
number of intakes constructed and changes in
the design of intakes: new ‘full-sill weirs’ allowed
uppermost intakes to abstract all the water during
low-flow periods (Lankford 2004). This
observation conflicted with other theories about
hydrological change, some of which play a minor
role. Good science was critical here; and
although it need not be highly sophisticated, it
should at the very least be underpinned by field
observations. Work under the RIPARWIN project
on the plains with flow-gauging equipment,
satellite imagery and a GPS (Global Positioning
System) revealed where the main losses of water
were occurring on the rivers; something that until
that moment, has remained a conjecture.
Scope for water re-allocation – efficiency,
productivity and storage
When demand for water either globally or
seasonally exceeds the available supply,
re-allocation of water from one use (say,
agriculture) to another (say, ecological flows)
becomes necessary. Moving to a consensus on
how water is to be allocated and shared requires
knowledge on the solvability of the proposed re-
allocation; whether water is ‘available’ either
within the hydrological record for storing
10, or
within the net or gross demands of a particular
water sector for saving and re-allocation. Water
availability is not only assessed from the
hydrograph of supply against consumption but
also from developing a picture of ultimate goals,
for example, of where water is working ‘hardest’,
i.e., more productively and efficiently. Thus, the
goal-making process is informed by a
‘productivity maximization’ perspective. Poverty
reduction or equity in either water supply or
benefits from water is another possible goal with
rather different implications. Similarly, scoping
must include a cost-benefit analysis to determine
the economic gains and costs of pursuing
various strategies.
An important precursor is to determine
whether water exists to be re-allocated on the
basis of either subtracting from the net needs of
a donor sector or from savings made within the
gross water usage of that sector. The science
underlying the ‘scope’ for re-allocation is
critical – it is this that the experienced water
manager is attempting to ascertain. In irrigation,
a commonplace theory is that efficiency is low
enough and gross volumes of water used high
enough for ample savings to be made to provide
water to other sectors. This logic is not certain,
10 Storage is an allocation device, and expands the opportunities for re-allocation between sectors. Storage holds water that otherwise
would generate environmental goods in providing a range of natural flows downstream. The ‘donating’ sector in this case is the
environment during the wet season.16
not least because the theory of irrigation
efficiency is dependent on boundary conditions
and its detailed measurement is rare (Lankford
2006). Conceptual work by the International
Water Management Institute (IWMI)(Molden 1997;
Perry 1999) shows that local losses need not be
seen as consumptive losses from the basin. In
other words, the real efficiency of all irrigation
within a basin may already be high, and savings
are unlikely to be forthcoming. Furthermore, even
if possible, the outcome of transferred water is
not guaranteed because of social costs involved
and because local irrigators may recapture
‘spare’ water.
The case study in Usangu provides an
example of the errors in scientific understanding
of irrigation efficiency. The River Basin
Management and Smallholder Irrigation
Improvement Project (RBMSIIP) (World Bank
1996) was based on the premise that the project
could raise efficiency from 15 to 30 percent,
allowing substantial re-allocation of water, as the
quote below from the Appraisal Report explains,
and that this would be achieved by improving
intakes and training farmers. Yet, closer
measurement indicates that effective efficiency
was probably in the region of 45 to 65 percent
precisely because of reuse of drain water by
tailenders (Machibya 2003). The errors contained
in this quote are that: a) the efficiency was very
low; b) the losses were depleted from the basin;
c) improving intakes would reduce losses; and d)
savings would automatically move downstream to
the hydropower reservoirs.  The failure to
ground-truth some of these assumptions is
evident in that the project went ahead as
planned.
“In order to illustrate this effect, the “savings”
in water which result from the improvement of
some 7,000 ha of traditional irrigated area
under the project (this includes both basins)
are valued using their capacity to generate
electricity in the downstream turbines. An
average “in the field” requirement of 8,000
m
3 of water, for one ha of rice production,
implies withdrawal of 53,300 m
3 from the
river, with an irrigation efficiency of 15
percent. Following improvements in irrigation
infrastructure and an increase in irrigation
efficiency to 30 percent, the withdrawal
requirement from the river drops to 26,700
m
3 per hectare. This releases some 26,700
m
3 for every hectare of improved irrigation, to
be used for hydropower generation
downstream. For this exercise, the water is
valued at 5 US cents per m
3, the valuation
for residential electricity use (34 percent of
all electricity use, and intermediate point
between the two alternate values)” (World
Bank 1996: 42).
Part 2:  Development of expedient
water goals
The second part of the framework generates
goals of water allocation. The question is whether
in a covertly (or overtly) political process, there
is a science of creating goals for water
allocation. By making this an open question, key
problems can be addressed. First, breaking
‘goal-making’ into stages provides a more
transparent knowledge-based approach. Second,
the stages reveal where the ‘principles of IWRM’
(e.g., “water is a basic right”) reside in this
process. This allows us to, third, articulate goals
that result in operable water management
strategies but which might be quite disassociated
with principles of IWRM. This step-change is
solved by iteratively formulating expedient water
goals, as is explained below.
Principles of allocation
The conflicting range of principles of water
allocation, and the priority and scale that they
best apply to, make goal-articulation
difficult – often it is not easy to discern what
criteria are being pursued. Yet, at the same time,
being aware of these principles, even ad hoc
historical legacy types, is an important part of
the debate about river basin management
objectives – in this respect, this is one of the
few places where our framework refers to some
of the key thinking that underpins IWRM.
Table 2 gives a number of drivers and principles
in tension and lists the ways in which goals of
water allocation can be argued for, including the17
commonly held notion that water should flow to
users that generate the highest economic utility
for the water used. This paper contends that
these principles do not lend themselves to a
more refined articulation of goals; rather, they
retrospectively shore up goals that have been
otherwise derived and then applied to different
phases of the water supply regime.
Allocation options
River basin science also requires an explicit
definition of the allocation options to assist the
process of creating goals for water allocation. Table
3 provides some of the allocation options, including
basin-wide allocation. Classifying allocation in the
Great Ruaha, we argue that it is a basin-wide
approach in assessment terms, but is implemented
in sub-basins. As explained under section
‘Expedient goal-making,’ it seeks a return to
year-round flow via partial re-allocation amongst
sectors, employing cross-basin and local solutions.
Allocation scenarios
Allocation scenarios therefore provide a series of
‘future options’ where the main emphasis is on
influencing economic patterns in the basin that
emanate from the current water distribution
pattern rather than by formulating a water
distribution plan that strictly adheres to
safeguarding idealistic IWRM ‘principles’ of water
TABLE 2.
Principles of water allocation within river basins.
Principle Explanation and definition
As before A priori rights determined by historical legacy may affect water use. This principle is behind
riparian rights that allow users to claim water by dint of their location close to a river. “Grandfather
rights” meant that water rights could not be revoked unless new water laws were passed.
Precipitation-based The Helsinki Protocol states that water may be allocated in accordance with rainfall amounts
found within parts of the river basin.
Higher economic utility Often cited to be the main reason for re-allocation, water should flow to its highest value user to
(Principle of water as an maximize economic utility for the river basin/nation. An example is of water allocation out of
economic good) agriculture (a low value user), and into industry or power generation (a high value user) or from
low value to high value agriculture. A similar case, or sub-clause, is that water is redistributed to
ensure higher water productivity.
Drinking, health and The principle that water is vital for life is often enshrined in domestic water rights that usually
sanitation, and scalar have the highest priority call on available water. Growing domestic demand from towns and cities
effects (Principle of water scale up this demand requiring re-balanced allocation.
as a basic need)
Higher or wider livelihood A concept arguing that water should be safeguarded for poverty-focused productive livelihoods;
utility (Principle of e.g., water for irrigated agriculture. The argument is that poorer sectors cannot afford expensive
affordability) water yet poverty results in high social externalities and costs, whereas higher value sectors are
better placed financially to afford more expensive water-saving or water-finding solutions.
Environmental needs Humans determine changing priorities of water use. The clearest example here is of the supply
(Changing functional or for environmental needs, which in the last 10-15 years has come to be recognized as an
value priorities and principle important if not priority demand for water. Thus, water in a river basin need not be fully allocated
of societal values) in order for re-allocation to be required.
Conflict resolution A class of change in priorities mentioned above, has special mention because of increasing
occurrence, significance and need for resolution. Here lie a complex interaction of behavior, fears
and norms surrounding perceptions of demand, needs, wants, costs and benefits.
Principles of equity Issues related to scarcity of water and nature of the water body. Physical division according to
(Fixed versus proportional, supply or value associated with the use of water. Or division according to proportions of available
and value derived) water (%’s).18
allocation. Allocation categories or scenarios can
encapsulate in words, new arrangements or goals
of water use. One scenario is ‘status quo’ or
‘business as usual’, while another is ‘ad hoc’. As
an example, Shin (1999) developed a scenario-
consequence analysis, based on economic
growth forecasts, to assess alternatives for water
management in a northern China river basin.
Another issue is that future allocation scenarios
seem to underplay natural variability and security
of supply. The Ruaha Basin Decision Aid
(RUBDA), which can be set to reflect hydrologic
variability, can be used to generate three main
scenarios. These are termed ‘Balanced’ (ensuring
year round flow through the Ruaha National Park,
but also allowing water for rice and hydropower),
‘Hydropower’ (providing more water for Mtera-
Kidatu Reservoir) and ‘Irrigation’ (favoring
upstream irrigation to the detriment of
downstream flows). We argue that scenario
planning (in terms of one choice over another) for
water is rarely implemented – instead it is
economic planning and activity that tends to lead
here. Instead, we suggest that water scenario
planning helps inform the identification of more
specific expedient goals (see below).
Time horizons
From the literature, scenarios are utilized to
generate pictures of long-term consequences,
and rarely are placed within a time frame, largely
because the latter is a separate exercise initiated
by political and institutional interests. For the
Ruaha, the target of year-round flow has been
set politically at 2010 (see next section). Time
horizons necessarily provide stimulus for action,
and although this is a target that might generate
winners and losers, or may not in the end be
realistic, the setting of a time horizon does
enable a strategy to be developed that works
towards that goal. In this respect, it provides a




Options for water distribution and allocation.
Issue Comparative options
Allocation Capture. Water shares change as a result of Re-allocation. In cross-sectoral allocation or
de-facto growth of allocation to one sector without re-allocation, water is actively moved out as a
forward planning. result of employment of allocation devices.
Unit Hydrological. Usually the river basin or sub-basin, Political boundary unit. A political boundary (e.g.,
see below. region or district) is used as the unit of
management; this may cut across river basins
(international rivers) or be part of a river basin.
Hydrology Surface water Sub-surface
Scale of river Large scale. The river basin is the unit of Smaller scale. Sub-basin or minor catchment.
basin or water management or alternatively, a given aquifer Part of a hydrological body is the unit of management.
body boundary is the unit of management.
Basin versus Basin response Local response
local response Intra-basin transfer. Water is moved within one basin User relocation. The user relocates in order to find
to water from one user to another. water, thereby acquiring it. Acquisition of irrigation
shortages Inter-basin transfer. Water is moved out from or supplies by growing cities in Asia.
into a basin from a neighboring basin or aquifer. Local supply solution. The user obtains water
from the hydrological cycle; desalinization;
boreholes, reservoirs – often this involves
using water that was stored that in the longer run
might have played an environmental role.
11 It should be noted that nine years passed between it first being articulated and set as a target, rather than the time period now left.19
Expedient goal-making
In Ruaha, the agreed water allocation goal is to
return the river to year-round flow by 2010.  This
follows from the statement made by the Prime
Minister of Tanzania, Frederick Sumaye, in London
in March 2001, for the Rio+10 Summit
12. Yet, how
have the principles, options and scenarios
translated into this articulated goal? It is difficult to
see the linkages here, but the notion of expedient
goals seems to answer this if we break down river
basin management into three phases (figures 4 and
6). Expedient goal-making in the case of Ruaha
functions by fitting goals to the likelihood of
success in altering patterns of water use within
each phase, and by finding that across all three
phases, niches of water demand exist that cater for
various principles and scenarios of water allocation.
Thus, achieving year-round flow is seen as a
‘medial’ water goal that, while politically motivated
in this instance, meets Tanzania’s emerging
environmental concerns but need not jeopardize
agriculture and hydropower because it is
predominantly a dry season goal. As figure 6
shows, the return to year-round flow means that the
substantial use of non- or low-beneficial water in
dry season agriculture has to be curtailed,
something that is possible in the larger perennial
sub-catchments given the predominant rice-fallow
cropping pattern. In other smaller perennial
sub-catchments, high value agriculture non-rice
crop rotations are more normal.
12 “I am delighted to announce that the Government of Tanzania is committing its support for a programme to ensure that the Great
Ruaha River has a year round flow by 2010. The programme broadly aims at integrating comprehensive approaches towards resources
planning, development and management so that human activity does not endanger the sustenance of the Great Ruaha ecosystems.”
(N.B. ‘Programme’ here refers to government and non-government initiatives).
FIGURE 6.
Adapting water goals to fit water supply and demand patterns.20
It is possible to articulate other goals and
related principles; in the wet season, ample ‘bulk’
water could be apportioned between agricultural
needs (giving water as a pro-poor livelihood
right), environmental needs and hydropower
storage, the latter fulfilling the principle of water
as an economic good.
Meeting small, timely and much-needed
freshwater needs during the ‘critical’ state of the
driest part of the dry season is a considerable
challenge for basin authorities and often marks a
period of intense conflict. In the dry season,
critical water goals, (meeting the principle of
water as a basic right) would come from a
program of boreholes and piped supplies rather
than the coarser instrument of attempting to
adjust allocation via the current system of
irrigation water rights and intake improvement.
Improved secure village water supplies as
‘replacements’ for surface water could provide
incentives for stakeholders to discuss surface
water distribution. A nexus between village water
supply and catchment management can then be
made, hitherto often the remit of separate local
authorities and river basin offices, respectively.
Part 3: The expedient response – water
management
In this section, and following figure 5, under a
number of headings, we give examples of the
expedient response by developing a multi-stage
strategy for managing the Ruaha River Basin to
achieve the vision of returning the river to year-
round flow.
River flow targets – routing the water
Having derived the expedient goals of water
distribution in the basin, it is necessary to
specify how they can be achieved. For each
sub-catchment, this means specifying how
much water is required in volume, time and
place for a particular use/user. In this
discussion, we use only medial water during the
dry season as an example.
We term this exercise ‘routing the water.’ It
involves mapping out mathematically and
geographically a cascade map to ensure water
physically moves through the landscape from
sources to users (tables 4 and 5 and figures 7, 8
and 9). In order to provide year-round flow for the
Ruaha through the national park, target flows for
the supply of the wetland in upstream perennial
sub-catchments have been identified for each
month of the dry season. Working backwards, this
gives the allowable irrigation abstraction from the
supply of water running off the high catchment.
The same exercise can be conducted for a dry or
wet year of rainfall, and for the wet season, if
flows downstream for the hydropower reservoirs
are required. The river basin decision-aid RUBDA
(Cour et al. n.d.) based on hydrological modeling
(Kashaigili et al. 2006), is ideal for this target
creation for a given scenario, and can be
compared to the current situation (table 4 and
figure 8). Understanding uncertainty and risk is
central to such scenario development.
Table 5 and figure 9 indicate that in order to
maintain a flow in the Ruaha National Park,
approximately 5 to 7 cumecs on average need to
be released below the irrigation intakes during the
dry season (July through to November). Two
factors relate to this. First, this is partly
dependent on whether the wetland can be kept
topped up during the latter part of the wet season,
and therefore intake and canal regulation is also
important in this season.  Second, by revealing
shortfalls, tables 4 and 5 allow us to determine
whether storage is required to capture excess wet
season water to augment dry season flows.
The target of 5 to 7 cumecs can be
compared to the pre-2001 situation where river
flows of less than this target were recorded
below the irrigation intakes entering the wetland
during the latter half of the dry season (SMUWC
2001)
13. In effect, it becomes increasingly less
13 One of the co-authors, Lankford, was the irrigation specialist on the SMUWC project and helped record these observations and
measurements.21
likely to find spare water above 4 cumecs, in
effect requiring that water flowing into the
irrigation systems is reduced, thereby curtailing
productive and livelihood activities within the
command areas of those systems. In the
absence of additional storage, one solution would
be to opt for 4 to 5 cumecs as a target flow, but
to channel a portion of this through the wetland
so that about 0.5 cumecs flows to the exit
onward to the Ruaha National Park. This would
entail a tradeoff in environmental benefits
between the wetland and the National Park.
TABLE 4.
Irrigation and wetland losses in the catchment leading to zero flows (1998-2003).
June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
A. Natural Upstream river supply 18.74 11.98 9.73 8.12 7.01 7.15 17.86
(cumecs)
B. Recent irrigation abstraction 9 8 7.5 7.5 6.7 6.7 14
(cumecs)
C. Downstream flows 9.74 3.98 2.23 0.62 0.31 0.45 3.86
(cumecs)
D. Losses in wetland 6 1.98 1.23 0.62 0.31 0.45 0.62
(cumecs)
E. Downstream river flows in RNP 3210003.24
(cumecs)
Source: Average monthly flows between 1998 and 2003, Kashaigili et al. (2006).
FIGURE 7.
Target flows in rivers and allowable abstractions to meet Ruaha goal.
Note: See figure 3 for location of A, B, C, D and E.22
Allocation management framework
In the previous section, a routing exercise
indicated where and how much water was
required.  This quantifies the water goals. In this
section, we explore a number of ways in which
these goals can be met. We argue that rather
than defining them in the normative language of
IWRM, it is more relevant to build an “expedient
response” in keeping with the three states of
water flow.
Key rivers in critical periods
An initial step is to identify key rivers where
activities can lever as much benefit as possible
(Lankford 2001). In 2001, the Rufiji Basin Water
Office (RBWO) initiated an intake regulation
program designed to ensure a reduction in dry
season abstraction from the three key rivers
feeding the wetland. To this end, negotiations
with three large state farms led to reductions in
their water supply during the dry season to give
enough water for domestic use rather than for
irrigation of fields that were visibly not producing
crops of any type. This clearly focused on a
‘medial water’ problem. Lately, the RBWO has
regulated intake flows during the latter part of the
wet season to help keep the wetland topped up
leading to both more wetland evaporation and
higher downstream flows; a focus on ‘bulk water’
with a knock-on effect on the dry season.
Infrastructure for river basin management
Water allocation is strongly mediated by the
presence of infrastructure, often playing multiple
roles in augmenting supply for one sector and
reducing demand from another. For example, on
the Usangu Plains, pipes to villages are a supply
solution for domestic use but, in reducing the
need to abstract water through the canals, they
are also a demand solution for irrigation which
leaves more water for in-stream environmental
benefits. In problem-focused water management,
infrastructure is added, removed or adjusted within
sub-catchments to meet their target allocations.
This is framed within each of the three phases of
water supply, as table 6 shows. For example, in
Usangu, there are few sites for cost-effective
capture of bulk water using large reservoirs,
though a case might be made on the Ndembera
River for water supply to the Ruaha National Park
during the dry season, a water-scarce period.
Thus, bulk water would be taken from the wet
season and re-allocated during the dry season to
TABLE 5.
Calculations of water required to provide a perennial flow in the Great Ruaha.
June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
A. Natural upstream river supply 18.74 11.98 9.73 8.12 7.01 7.15 17.86
(cumecs)
B. Allowable irrigation abstraction if 2.78 1.67 1.37 1.15 0.95 0.99 2.36
downstream targets are met
(cumecs)
C. Target downstream flows to meet 15.96 10.31 8.36 6.97 6.06 6.16 15.5
wetland losses and exit flows
(cumecs)
D. Modeled losses in wetland 11.55 8.1 7.02 6.13 5.34 5.44 11.05
(cumecs)
E. Target downstream river flows in 4.41 2.21 1.34 0.84 0.72 0.72 4.45
RNP (cumecs)23
FIGURE 8.
Dry season depletion in the Usangu catchment leading to zero flows (1998-2003).
FIGURE 9.
Future adjustments to irrigation depletion to provide perennial flow.24
the environment, making more water available on
other tributaries for productive use.
The design of irrigation intakes by RBMSIIP
and other programs (UVIP 1993; WER
Engineering 1993) influences water allocation.
Where conventionally designed ‘full-sill weirs’ are
installed upstream, downstream users are
subjected to extreme low flows in the dry season
as a result of the uppermost intakes abstracting
all the water. These conventional types of intake
aggravate a delicate situation where dry season
flows of only 100-200 l/sec have to be shared
between intakes and in-stream users. One
possible solution is to adjust the intake design
so that, first, a volumetric cap allows excess
‘bulk’ water to flow downstream during the wet
season, and second, a proportional cap allows
sharing of medial water during the dry season
(Lankford and Mwaruvanda 2006).
Tanzania proposes to establish Apex Bodies (the
term for sub-catchment water user associations)
to decide how water should be shared within the
catchment and released downstream. One model
(MOWLD 2004) represents an ideal by providing
an institutional body for each river level. However,
disadvantages arise from the requirement for four
layers: 1) basin, 2) sub-catchment forums,
3) sub-catchment water user associations (WUA,
i.e., ‘Apex Bodies’), and 4) irrigation WUAs. In
addition, user fees are required to support these
institutions. A more serious critique is the
comprehensiveness of the ‘social engineering’
underlying these proposals, i.e., the assumption
that wholly new institutional frameworks can be
imposed from outside without considering the
inherently political, contingent and un-predictable
nature of institutional reform processes; see for
example, Cleaver and Franks (2003) and Merrey
TABLE 6.
Classification of river basin infrastructure.
Water flow Examples and sub-types Definitions and notes
state
Critical flows Technology for poverty-focused water This class of infrastructure attends to critical flows
acquisition (taps, pipes, boreholes, rainfall that meet and safeguard domestic and environmental
harvesting) objectives
Medial flows Irrigation intake design for water sharing, Water acquisition and sharing of medial flows between
proportional capping. intakes
In-stream weirs Protecting major source of income for many people
(irrigation)
In-stream and storage environmental protection
Bulk water Irrigation intake design for volumetric Capping of maximum amount of water taken by irrigation
flows abstraction cap.
Large reservoirs Reservoirs capture floodwater for storage and release for
beneficial use during medial or critical water periods
Organizational and institutional set up
A pragmatic approach indicates that institutional
design should be questioned and refined.
Although handing over to the correctly-identified
group, invoking the principle of subsidiarity, is
seen as an integral part of integrated water
management – the manner in which this group is
supported and is provided with institutional space
is critical to the success of that provision.
et al. (2007). Instead of imposing such an
overarching structure, it is more relevant to
consider which of the tiers are most necessary
(or indeed energetic), and thus how water
management should be supported at this chosen
level, allowing that tier to determine and evolve its
institutional design and relationships with other
tiers or organizations. It may be a matter of
timescales and deployment; while the four-tier
structure makes sense in the long-term, there is25
little in the national strategy of how the current
institutional structure in different sub-catchments
will be the basis for development.
Legislative framework
A review of the water policy, strategy and
legislation of Tanzania indicates a tendency for
water legislation to put into ‘legalese’, or to
encode, notions and principles of IWRM without
examining how water is actually managed. This
legal framework appears to foster a situation
where water management is framed in terms of
principles to be applied. Thus, the policy-
strategy-law continuum is internally coherent but
in that continuum the strains that water rights
and fees place on the governance of surface
water management are not recognized.  Thus,
irrigation water in Tanzania legally attracts an
annual ‘economic water user fee,’ a regulatory
device that, as outlined below, either has no
effect, or simply increases demand. In another
example, institutional space for informal water
rights is provided but no detail on their
relationship to and precedence over formal water
rights is given. It may be several years before
this relationship is described by any further legal
refinements. Expedient water management seeks
much greater traction here and encourages local
users to formulate byelaws and customary
agreements to minimize conflict and to distribute
water accordingly.  The scalar challenge is to
marry these agreements with formal water laws
and with users further downstream who might not
be represented, so that such agreements are
allied to intra and inter-sectoral allocation needs.
As explained in the next section, a proposal by
Lankford and Mwaruvanda (2006) gives one way
in which this might occur.
Economic instruments
In Ruaha, the theory that formal economic
instruments influence water allocation by costing
the demand for water has been problematic, even
perverse in its outcome (van Koppen et al.
2004). Fixed fees have not acted to dampen
demand or associate a value with water use, as
was intended, nor could they have since the fee
is not directly linked to water use. Indeed they
may have supported demand for water by
augmenting perceptions of a ‘right’ as a result of
having “paid for the water” that conflicts with the
needs of downstream (paying) users. On the
other hand, some farmers in Usangu have
discussed and implemented their own land-based
tax to help restrict overdevelopment of land. This
contrast between the formal economic
instruments and the self-introduction of informal
charges informs an expedient approach in which
water users are not against demand management
incentives; their formulation and the means by
which they are introduced and supported is more
likely to produce a desired outcome.
Building on current water permit legislation,
Lankford and Mwaruvanda (2006) propose a
framework of wet and dry season abstractions.
During the wet season, the formal permit would fit
the maximum abstraction through the cumulative
intake capacity that curtails the irrigation use of
bulk water (termed the volumetric cap). Adjusting
the volumetric cap would require the intakes to be
re-configured so that when set at their maximum
opening, their discharge fits with the targets on
bulk water abstraction
14. During the remainder of
the year, local users could negotiate informal
rights as shares of medial water during the dry
season, either as proportions of the river flow or
as time scheduling.
14 Although infrastructure can be circumvented, observations in Usangu show that physical limitations of abstraction tend not to be
exceeded. Instead, new intakes are built. Yet, when playing the River Basin Game, local users opined that a catchment-wide
representative body should halt the development of new intakes and reconcile existing ones so that they function better cumulatively
and in sequence.26
Recurrent water management
With regards to the practical implementation of
the framework, this section describes two issues
that feed into the day-to-day management of that
framework. We omit other factors that support
daily management such as logistics, finance,
personnel, administration, training and resources,
as they are adequately covered elsewhere in the
literature.
Cross-compliance mechanisms: Cross-compliance
defines mutual agreements for progressively
implementing an agreed schedule of initiatives
between two or more partners (See for example,
DEFRA 2006
15). Cross-compliance wraps all
parties in such agreements, motivating and
leveraging further action out of the parties
involved. Appropriately designed conditionalities,
such as the establishment of a water user
association, are attached to project benefits.
Thus, for example, water users ‘comply’ with
some responsibilities in response to or parallel to
work being completed by Government or NGO
offices. However, the deployment of both the
project benefit (the intake) and the facilitation and
monitoring of the conditional response from the
users requires us to consider the role and nature
of ‘service providers’ under conditions of fiscal
restraint, structural adjustment and governmental
capacity (Batley 2004).
In the new Tanzanian Water Resources
Strategy (MOWLD 2004), the role of the
Government is worth examining. In the draft
document, the Government believes that it should
no longer be a service provider
16 (Section 3.1.3,
page 14). However, under a cross-compliance
framework this downscaling has to be thoroughly
interrogated; the Government has to be a service
provider, albeit a strategic and tactical one,
because water users in Usangu are paying fees
for water, and ‘service return’ becomes necessary
for ongoing fee collection. Enhanced service
provision does not automatically assume more
time and money spent in the field by Government,
but instead resources facilitate a range of other
government and non-governmental services or
agreements, some of which will be purchased
17.
We envisage the following possibilities: bulk water
rights to a single catchment on the assumption
that the WUA will distribute it to users; sourcing
conflict resolution facilitators; coordinating
infrastructural changes to improve water
management at the catchment level; sourcing
funds to improve water source security (e.g.,
dams and boreholes); clarifying legislation for local
user groups; locating specialists able to provide
GIS and mapping services; and resolving water
rights issues. Thus, the basin office collaborates
with a given sub-catchment WUA to move it
through various stages of water development.
Cross-compliance applies to both the river
basin and sub-catchment scale, but also,
importantly to irrigation systems. Irrigation has
special significance because, although
government and donor institutions should be
cautious about rolling out more irrigation schemes,
there is a case for their involvement to facilitate
improved water management.  However, rather
than this occurring because engineers dictate that
irrigation efficiency is ‘low’ with little dialogue with
users as has happened in the past (World Bank
1996), it is better framed as a response to
15 “There is no longer a link between production and support. Instead, to receive payments, you are asked to demonstrate that you
are keeping your land in Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition (GAEC) and complying with a number of specified legal
requirements relating to the environment, public health and plant health, animal health and welfare, and livestock identification and
tracing (SMRs). Meeting these requirements is described in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) legislation as ‘cross compliance’”.
(Advice to UK farmers on page 7, Cross Compliance Handbook for England, DEFRA 2006).
16  The term ‘service provider’ covers many activities, including power generation; here we restrict ourselves to the governmental
activities of the river basin office, zonal irrigation office and district council, supported in turn by central administrators in Dar es
Salaam. Service provision is clear in the context of irrigation. In the context of basin management, what service is being received and
how is it linked to payment.
17 A simple calculation shows that farmers could afford a more organized approach to purchasing services. One percent of the value
of Usangu rice sold from a 1,000 ha system is about 10,000 dollars (one 80 kg bag of rice sells for 30 US dollars).27
requests by farmers who genuinely identify and
verbalize water distribution problems. Such an
approach has the important dimensions of being
problem-focused, service-oriented, responsive, and
demand-led. Various activities are envisaged;
partnership engineering, facilitation sessions,
game and role-playing, farmer training, problem
ranking and participatory institutional analysis. It is
likely that such an approach will further strengthen
participatory skills amongst engineers whose
current training tends to focus on conventional
methodologies. The international community can
play a role in facilitating such capacity reform and
sharing of lessons among countries and regions,
and in ensuring that existing budgets are partly
used for these activities – implying little additional
cost here.
Working with local detail: Expediting allocation
relies on marrying higher-level incentives with the
cumulative outcomes of detailed water
management at the field and irrigation intake
level and a willingness to engage with and foster
local knowledge. This is an important point in
sub-Saharan Africa where formal and
governmental processes of re-allocation are
difficult to apply in the kinds of circumstances
found (e.g., large distances, disparate many
users, lack of government resources).
Furthermore, detailed knowledge underpinned by
field validation allows higher-level policies to be
appropriately drafted and gives space for local
users to explore their own methods for improving
the productivity of water (Lankford 2006).
RBMSIIP (River Basin Management and
Smallholder Irrigation Improvement Project)
envisaged re-allocation coming about because of
a combination of water rights and efficiency
gains – yet with regards to the latter, the
RBMSIIP program revealed a lack of
engagement with detail, believing that Usangu
irrigation systems depleted water via seepage
within the hierarchical canal system. This is
understandable given that most irrigation
engineers are trained to conceive irrigation
efficiency as being a product of canal-level
efficiencies multiplied together. Yet, losses in
Usangu irrigation schemes, which are not
hierarchically canalized in nature, do not arise
during the supply of water to the crop but rather
because of evaporation before and after the
window of evapotranspiration during crop growth.
We believe that working with detail also
solidifies agreements made between stakeholders
and then helps take things forward incrementally,
so binding in progress. Stankey et al. ( 2005)
identify that incremental progress is a key
feature of adaptive natural resource management.
Thus, for example in Usangu, farmers first
consider canal cleaning as a first step, prior to
implementing other water saving agreements.
Working with detail can be achieved in
several ways, including by devolving
responsibility for water management to farmers.
Farmers are concerned about wasteful water
practices that they themselves define and
observe each day. For example, the River Basin
Game (Lankford et al. 2004a) generates
considerable discussion of what constitutes
waste and what to do about it. These
discussions build on an agreement that
productivity of rice need not be reduced. In
addition, some farmers, independently of the
IWRM solutions forwarded by the Government,
have explored economic solutions to demand
management – they agreed to a land-based
byelaw that encourages people to manage a few
acres of land that can then be supplied with
water rather than optimistically clearing land that
remains dry (SMUWC 2001). The comparison
between the Government-fixed charges for water
rights and the marginal rules promoted by
farmers speaks loudly about the ability of
different ‘players’ to craft solutions based on
intimate knowledge of how to dampen water
demand in the face of shortages of supply.
Benefits are gained from having experienced
water professionals provide inputs here, but this
is entirely different from a government call to
provide training to farmers on water management
as this is unlikely to reach the level of detail
required by experienced irrigators that changes
from place to place and over time.28
Water resources assessment and monitoring
Water resource assessment (WRA) and
monitoring observes the efficacy of water
management and is a critical part of the
framework, enabling adjustment of the goals and
devices. However, ways need to be found to
obtain data sustainably and transparently on
flows and supply and demand, for example, by
eventually involving local users in the recording
and utilization of those flows. Although this has
not been tried in Usangu, there may be some
appetite for exploring such a move. Sessions
with the river basin game demonstrated that
users, in the face of water scarcities, are
increasingly interested in monitoring each other’s
water use, and that monitoring need not start
with flow discharge measurement, but rather with
simple depth recordings. WRA, and its costs and
benefits, should be part of the water social
learning by both users and professionals.
Revisit water goals
The final part of the framework for expedient
water management involves revisiting the water
goals in order to pragmatically adjust it or add
details that incorporate other principles of
allocation. This accords with the finding by
Stankey et al. (2005) that nearly all theories
around adaptive natural resource management
includes some notion of incremental adjustments.
Part 4: Social learning in water
The previous sections describe the three stages
of acquiring knowledge, establishing goals and
creating water strategies. We posit that a fourth,
social learning within a water-competitive
environment, is at the heart of these. We
understand that vibrant social learning selects
appropriate activities and programs to expose
issues, mediate conflict and deploy solutions.
On the other hand, a dysfunctional social
learning arises from inappropriate or infrequently
held activities. Thus, at the center of expedient
water management is the development of
capacity and skills through iterative social and
technical learning by all water stakeholders.
Iterative learning and devices and tools to
support it is also a feature of adaptive NRM
(Natural Resources Management)(Tompkins and
Adger 2004; Stankey et al. 2005; Hagmann and
Chuma 2002).
A review of RIPARWIN’s experience in
Ruaha, and of the literature, points to some key
elements of social learning in water: the cautious
use of experts but a wider discussion of their
findings; the use of inclusive stakeholder
deliberative tools and processes (e.g., workshops
based around the River Basin Game); support to
the Basin Office via a river basin decision-aid
that gives options for managing water and water
rights while allowing the operator to see the
outcomes of what-if scenarios without being
overly didactic; and providing ‘social learning’
opportunities to local groups using educational
and conflict resolution tools as well as farmers’
own experimentation and observation as a means
to determine perspectives on water sharing and
management. Experimentation on a catchment
scale is also to be considered (see also
Gunderson 1999, on connections between
experimentation and adaptive management), and
might generate insights regarding how to share
water, as evidenced by the experiments in the
Mkoji sub-catchment facilitated by the
RIPARWIN project (Vounaki and Lankford 2006).
The River Basin Game has considerable potential
here, as it elicits many suggestions, for example,
on saving water while maintaining rice production.
With respect to new (or adjustments to) devices
to adjust allocation (e.g., infrastructure), these
can be openly part of a locally negotiated
process to sub-catchment water security.
On the other hand, learning is curtailed
when a particular water resources strategy is
held up as ‘finished’.
18 One antithesis to social
learning, therefore, is an over-reliance on
18 SMUWC was completed in 2.5 years, although it was originally envisaged to run for four years at the minimum. Mills and Clark
(2001) describe a nine-month river basin study expanded to five years as complexity of the issues became clearer.29
short-term consultancies framed within the pace
of project progression dictated by donor agency
schedules requiring demonstration of quick
results. Combined, these create difficulties in
developing long-term partnerships and expedient
strategies that need to be seated within a
dialogue between users and service providers.
Indeed, it is the pace of programming that
results in ‘idealized’ IWRM as compared to a
slower and more reflective pragmatic and
adaptive water resources management. How to
develop relevant skills in social learning of all,
or a necessary majority of the many
stakeholders involved, is a question with few
easy answers because serious challenges exist
in moving from consultation of stakeholders to
an adequate representation of their opinions
(Wester et al. 2003).
Conclusions
Although the term ‘integrated’ in IWRM denotes
a pragmatic and broad approach, IWRM
becomes ideological in two ways at the
operational level if, as can be observed all too
often, it is not adapted to the circumstances.
First, ideology is maintained if ‘integrated’
becomes the guiding principle to establish an
all-encompassing holistic approach, precluding a
more expeditious and sometimes even mono-
disciplinary ‘objectives-guided’ approach.
Second, ‘component ideology’ occurs by
applying a strand of IWRM theory without first
determining if it is fit. In Tanzania, an example
of misfit is the application of formal water rights
designed (poorly) to act as an economic tool
(van Koppen et al. 2004).  Returning to our
example of the Water Framework Directive
implementation in Europe, we can also find
evidence that supports a cautionary view of
ideological IWRM. Here, the pursuit of public
participation in river basin management, a core
requirement of the WFD in line with IWRM
ideology, was revealed during piloting as being
potentially wasteful of significant resources that
might be better spent on the task of managing
the environment (Fox 2004
19). The UK WFD pilot
phase concludes in support of an ‘expedient’
approach, promoting processes which fit the
task and urging that the nature of local issues
should determine the techniques employed and
stakeholders to be engaged within the basin
(Fox et al. 2004).
We posit that it is the choice of the starting
point that determines how appropriate the
subsequent iterations of water management
become. Starting with and then aiming to
institutionalize principles of water management
(in other words refining ideal IWRM to craft
operational IWRM) may not be sufficiently
accurate or efficient. On the other hand,
refraining from utilizing ‘ideal IWRM’ as a starting
template but attempting to expedite effective
strategies in water resources management that
resolutely examine the conditions found in the
river basin, might become more efficient, and
requires and defines an adaptive process.
Following this, the paper contains a practical
framework to guide the interpretive, adaptive
process of creating meaningful expedient water
management programs.
19 Public participation activities in the WFD Ribble Pilot Project cost £150,000, whilst only 14% of the general public were interested in
involvement and, significantly, the majority of these were existing members or supporters of organizations already represented in
pre-existing arrangements for stakeholder engagement (e.g., Recreational Fishing Clubs, the World Wide Fund for Nature and the
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds). The process has not obviously shifted priorities in terms of river basin management or
brought new thinking in terms of solutions.31
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Appendix A
Further Information on Water Policy, Institutions
Quote from World Bank, 1996. River Basin Management and Smallholder Irrigation
Improvement Project (RBMSIIP) - Staff Appraisal Report, Annex A, page 3.
Among several considerations to be included in the review of the existing policy and legislation are: (1)
the allocation of water as a public good and as an economic good with a value in all its competing
uses; (2) the use of a water user fee as a  means of encouraging efficient use of the resource and for
meeting the cost of regulatory functions; (3) the need for a definition of stakeholders in water resource
management; (4) clear recognition of stakeholder rights and the need for their participation in water
management activities, especially the women; (5) provisions for stakeholder representation in Basin
Water Boards; (6) clear indications that there will be periodic reviews on the fee, charges and fines to
discourage water pollution and other forms of misuse; (7) a clear statement that indicates moving
basin management operations towards self-financing; and (8) the need for strengthening the Basin
Water Offices and other institutions charged with monitoring water quality and with managing the legal
and incentive framework to induce efficient water use and maintenance of water quality. Some issues
to be addressed are as follows:
The Rufiji Basin Water Office (RBWO) was established in September 1993, under Act No. 10 of
1981 which amended the Act No. 42 of 1974. The RBWO roles cover:
• allocating water for various water users from water bodies in the basin
• controlling pollution of water in the basin
• overseeing all matters concerning water resources use and regulation as stipulated in
Act 42 of 1974 and its subsequent Amendments of Act No. 10 of 1981, Act No. 17
of 1989 and Act No. 8 of 1998.
Accordingly, the main activities of the RBWO include:
• regulating, monitoring and policing of water use in the Rufiji Basin
• issuing of water rights
• monitoring operations of hydropower generation reservoirs
• assisting in the formation of water users associations in the basin
• constructing control gates on irrigation furrows
• collection of water fees
• awareness creation  to water users regarding water resources management
• monitoring and control of water pollution in water bodies in the basin
• participation in activities of water related projects in the basin
Source: from SMUWC 2001.Research Reports
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